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A LAMENT FOR WHAT WAS ONCE  
AND YET CAN BE 
Hon. William G. Young*
Abstract: In the wake of 9/11, the American people showed unwavering 
faith in justice, fairness, and the rule of law through their steadfast service 
to the legal system. Yet one of the Bush administration’s first orders in the 
new “war on terror” was effectively to strip the courts and the juries of 
their role in the “trials” of our enemies, instead creating streamlined mili-
tary tribunals. This diminished role of the judiciary is unfortunately just 
the latest feature in a disturbing trend in the federal district courts, which 
has seen the process of fact-finding in open court exchanged for a reflec-
tive in-chambers review of written submissions, and the trial of actual dis-
putes replaced with “litigation management.” Most shocking is that the 
diminishment of the traditional American trial has been facilitated by the 
judiciary’s own institutional policies. Judge William G. Young of the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts makes a plea 
to all branches of government and the American people to halt the ero-
sion of the judiciary and return to the founding principles of our democ-
racy. 
                                                                                                                      
* United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts. The author would like to thank 
Angela M. Bushnell and her Boston College Law School Article Editing team for their re-
search assistance, and Guarav Singh for his work on Appendices A & B. The author would 
also like to thank David Chen and David Hine for their outstanding editorial assistance. 
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Introduction 
 At what point shall we expect the approach of danger? By what means 
shall we fortify against it? Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, 
to step the Ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, 
Asia and Africa combined, with the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) 
in their military chest; with a Buonaparte for a commander, could not by 
force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a 
trial of a thousand years. 
 At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it 
ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If 
destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a na-
tion of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide. 
—Abraham Lincoln, January 27, 1838, age 271
 At 8:56 AM, Tuesday, September 11, 2001, an unwanted future 
burst upon us. Terrorists launched a vicious attack upon Americans, 
unparalleled in ferocity and horror.2 When it was over, we had lost 
more people than were killed at Pearl Harbor,3 but unlike the Imperial 
Japanese Navy in 1941, the terrorists left no return address.4
 Yet Americans were undaunted. We had heroes aplenty. Passengers 
attempted to retake United Flight 93 and, at the cost of their own lives, 
diverted it from its intended target.5 New York’s firefighters ran into 
the doomed towers with cool professionalism even as people fled from 
every exit or jumped to their deaths.6 Some reported even when ex-
pressly told not to, and many others rushed to the crash sites directly 
from their own houses.7 President Bush immediately convened a “war 
council” with advisors from the State Department, Central Intelligence 
Agency, National Security Agency, and other key departments, and, on 
September 21, approved the first military plans to attack al Qaeda and 
Taliban targets in Afghanistan.8
 The federal courthouse in Boston, with its beautiful glass wall over-
looking the harbor, was guarded by Coast Guard reservists in Boston 
                                                                                                                      
1 Francis Trevelyan Miller & Edward Bailey Eaton, Portrait Life of Lincoln: 
The Greatest American 113 (1910). 
2 See Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission 
Report 1–14, 339 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Report]. 
3 See id. at 311, 552 n.188. 
4 See id. at 326, 399, 554 n.6. 
5 Id. at 13–14. 
6 Id. at 287, 289–91, 298–302, 306–08. 
7 9/11 Report, supra note 2, at 314. 
8 Id. at 330–38. 
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whalers mounting .50 caliber machine guns. Border Patrol officers in 
unfamiliar green uniforms thronged the courthouse cafeteria in be-
tween shifts of screening passengers at Logan International airport. 
Americans stood united in a way not seen since Pearl Harbor, but our 
unity was not only expressed in our military response or our humani-
tarian outreach to the victims.9 Within the judicial branch, citizen re-
sponse to jury subpoenas spiked to record levels.10 Amidst all the fre-
netic activity in the months following September 11, not one potential 
juror—not one—sought to be excused on the ground that the court-
house itself was a probable terrorist target. Americans came to serve in 
record numbers simply because their country called them. Still more 
impressive, and ultimately far more profound, in the year following 
September 11 the government’s conviction rate remained relatively 
unchanged.11 In other words, juries continued to perform their consti-
tutional role of providing impartial, even-handed justice even in the 
face of a looming, inchoate terrorist threat, and never subordinated 
their independent judgment to that of the government. 
 Then, on November 13, 2001, the President promulgated an order 
authorizing military tribunals to try non-citizens meeting certain crite-
ria.12 Such tribunals were not limited to theaters of active combat op-
erations, but were authorized to sit within the United States itself,13 
where federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of 
federal crimes.14 The tribunals did not have to follow the rules of evi-
dence,15 nor were their actions subject to judicial review.16 The saddest 
                                                                                                                      
9 See id. at xv–xviii, 13–14, 289–311, 326–34. 
10 See Thanassis Cambanis, Juror Scrutiny Reaches New Level, Boston Globe, July 12, 
2002, at B1. 
11 Compare U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2001 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics, app. B at “National Data” (2001), available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/ 
nat01.pdf (showing trial convictions as 3.4% of national convictions), with U.S. Sentenc-
ing Comm’n, 2002 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, app. B at “National 
Data” (2002), available at www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/nat02.pdf (showing trial convic-
tions as 2.9% of national convictions). 
12 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, § 4(a), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. 
§ 801 (2006). 
13 See id. §§ 3(a), 4(c)(1). 
14 Compare Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1, 40 (1942) (holding that an unlawful enemy 
belligerent may be tried by secret military tribunal within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States District Court), with Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 3 (1866) (holding that ab-
sent proper declaration of martial law, a secessionist saboteur who is not himself an enemy 
belligerent may not be tried by military tribunal within the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S. 
District Court). 
15 Military Order, supra note 12, § 4(c)(3). 
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irony is that the government justified these military tribunals in part by 
conjecturing that jurors might be fearful of serving on such cases,17 
even though Americans were turning out in record numbers for jury 
service.18
 I read this Military Order the next day while sitting in my cham-
bers. I remember with distinct clarity looking out over Boston Harbor 
at the city I love, where I have spent my entire professional life, and 
thinking, “This cannot be. Surely this will not stand.”19
 How wrong I was. After some bleating about civil liberties by pundits 
in the media, the press quickly fell into line, blandly referring to military 
detention as simply a “parallel track” to being indicted in the federal 
court system.20 The creation of these military tribunals thus reduced the 
citizen jury from the central feature of the U.S. justice system to nothing 
more than a “parallel track.”21 This has been the most profound shift in 
our legal institutions in my lifetime, and—most remarkable of all—it has 
taken place without engaging any broad public interest. 
 What is even more devastating is the fact that, rather than being an 
excrescence on our Constitution, this dismissive view of juries, fact-
finding, and judicial review may well prove the most enduring legacy of 
the Bush administration.22 This is because the policy making body for 
the lower level federal courts, the U.S. Judicial Conference, has little 
concern for any of these things. 
                                                                                                                      
16 See id. §§  4(c)(8), (7)(b)(2). 
17 See Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston, A Nation Challenged: Immigration: Bush Sets 
Option of Military Trials in Terrorist Cases, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2001, at A1 (“White House 
officials said the tribunals were necessary to protect potential American jurors from the 
danger of passing judgment on accused terrorists.”). 
18 See Cambanis, Juror Scrutiny Reaches New Level, supra note 10. 
19 Cf. Thomas L. Friedman, The Iraqi Invasion: Bush, Hinting Force, Declares Iraqi Assault 
“Will Not Stand”; Proxy in Kuwait Issues Threat, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at A1 (quoting 
President George H.W. Bush). 
20 See, e.g., Thanassis Cambanis, New Federal Security Act Remains Largely Unused, Boston 
Globe, June 23, 2002, at B1. 
21 See Adam Liptak, Accord Suggests U.S. Prefers to Avoid Courts, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2002, 
at A14. 
22 American exceptionalists (I consider myself one) can but rue the fact that jury trials 
for those whom the executive has characterized as terrorists apparently survived for seven 
years longer in Russia than in the United States. See Megan K. Stack, New Law in Russia 
Ends Jury Trials for “Crimes Against State”, L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 2009, at A3. 
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I. Jury Trials 
This is a trial court. Trial judges ought go out on the bench every day and try 
cases. 
—John H. Meagher, 197823
 The American jury system is dying—more rapidly on the civil than 
the criminal side, and more rapidly in the federal than the state 
courts—but dying nonetheless. 
 For decades, our civil juries have been incessantly disparaged by 
business and insurance interests. These interests know what they are 
doing. Recent analysis has led one commentator to conclude that “a 
civil justice system without a jury would evolve in a way that more relia-
bly serve[s] the elite and business interests.”24 What is most disturbing 
about this trend is that it has occurred without the courts offering any 
defense for the institution upon which their moral authority ultimately 
depends.25 Indeed, federal courts today seem barely concerned with 
jury trials.26 The federal judiciary has been willing “to accept a dimin-
ished, less representative, and thus sharply less effective civil jury.”27 
                                                                                                                      
23 John H. Meagher, the senior justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court, told me 
this when first I joined that bench. Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Ju-
ries, Vanishing Constitution, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 67, 83, 92 (2006) (quoting Hon. John 
Meagher in 1978). 
24 Valerie P. Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibil-
ity 226 (2000). 
25 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, at 
141. But see United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 110–11 (D. Mass. 2007) (defending 
the jury as the cornerstone of the legal system’s legitimacy); Ciulla v. Rigny, 89 F. Supp. 2d 
97, 100–03 (D. Mass. 2000) (offering a defense of juries). 
26 See Edmund V. Ludwig, The Changing Role of the Trial Judge, 85 Judicature 216, 217 
(2002) (“Trials, to an increasing extent, have become a luxury . . . when cases are handled 
as a package or a group instead of one at a time, it is hard, if not impossible, for the law-
yers or the judges to maintain time-honored concepts of due process and the adversary 
system.”). Judge Ludwig was at the time a member of the Court Administration and Case 
Management Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Comm. on 
Court Admin. & Case Mgmt., Judicial Conference of the U.S., Civil Litigation 
Management Manual, at iii (2001), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf (fol-
low “Publications & videos” hyperlink; then follow “Browse by Subject” hyperlink; then 
follow “Case Management—Civil” hyperlink). 
27 Rigny, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 102 n.6 (citing Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing 
Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice and Civil Judging, 49 
Ala. L. Rev. 133, 127–52 (1997)); see also Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Report on the 
Importance of Twelve-Member Civil Jury in the Federal Courts 34 (2002) (“The 
real question . . . is whether there are any legitimate reasons for departing from [twelve-
member juries].”); Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1408, 1466–89 
(1997). 
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The predicable result is that bipartisan majorities in Congress have se-
verely restricted access to the jury.28
 On the criminal side, manipulation of the federal sentencing 
guidelines has had the consequence of imposing savage sentences 
upon those who requested jury trials, a choice guaranteed under the 
Constitution.29 Small wonder that the rate of criminal jury trials in the 
federal courts has plummeted.30
 Yet in a government of the people, the justice of the many cannot 
be left to the judgment of the few. Nothing is more inimical to the es-
sence of democracy than the notion that government can be left to 
elected politicians and appointed judges. As Alexis de Tocqueville so 
elegantly stated, “The jury system . . . [is] as direct and extreme a con-
sequence . . . of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”31 
Like all government institutions, our courts draw their authority from 
the will of the people. The law that emerges from these courts provides 
the threads with which all our freedoms are woven. It is through the 
rule of law that liberty flourishes. Yet “there can be no universal respect 
for law unless all Americans feel that it is their law . . . .”32 Through the 
jury, the citizenry takes part in the execution of the nation’s law, and in 
that way, each can rightly claim that the law belongs partly to him or 
her.33
 Only because juries may decide most cases is it tolerable that 
judges decide some. However highly we view the integrity and quality of 
our judges, it is the judges’ colleague in the administration of justice— 
the jury—which is the true source of a court’s glory and influence. The 
involvement of ordinary citizens in judicial tasks provides legitimacy to 
all that is decreed. When a judge decides cases alone, “memories of the 
jury still cling to him.”34 A judge’s voice echoes the values and judg-
ment learned from observing juries at work. Ours is not a system where 
                                                                                                                      
28 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 
(1974); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 48 Stat. 899 (1934); Lirette v. Shiva Corp., 
27 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 n.3 (D. Mass. 1998); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. 
Supp. 49, 63 n.74 (D. Mass. 1997). 
29 See Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 67–68 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting a 
500% greater average sentence for criminals found guilty via jury trial over those who 
pleaded guilty and cooperated). 
30 See id. at 68–69. 
31 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 273 ( J.P. Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., Harper Collins 2000) (1835). 
32 Irving R. Kaufman, A Fair Jury—The Essence of Justice, 51 Judicature 88, 91 (1967). 
33 See de Tocqueville, supra note 31, at 273. 
34 Id. at 276. 
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judges cede some of their sovereignty to juries, but rather one where 
judges borrow the jury’s fact-finding authority.35
 In recent years, many judges appear to have forgotten that the true 
source of their power to render legal interpretations stems from the 
jury—their co-equal constitutional officers.36 It is the judiciary which 
has failed to place the jury trial at the very center of its operations 
where it belongs:37
[T]hose judges who thought that, by and large, we could do 
without juries and we would still have the same moral author-
ity, and our written opinions, our constitutional interpreta-
tions would still occupy the center stage of political discourse. 
Well, we are rather stunned that the President thought that, 
with respect to those people that he designated as enemies of 
the state, by and large, he could do without courts. And the 
Congress acquiesced.38
Whenever Congress extinguishes a right which, heretofore, has been 
vindicated in the courts through citizen juries, there is a cost. It is not a 
monetary cost, but rather a cost paid in rarer coin—the treasure of 
democracy itself.39
                                                                                                                      
35 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 236 (2005) (“A 
criminal judge sitting without a criminal jury was simply not a duly constituted federal 
court capable of trying cases, just as the Senate sitting without the House was not duly con-
stituted federal legislature capable of enacting statutes.”) (emphasis added). 
36 Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 111, 114–19. 
37 See generally Andrew Seigel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Or-
ganizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 1097 (2006) (demon-
strating the disdain shown by the Supreme Court for the lower courts). 
38 Hon. William G. Young, Speech to the Florida Bar Association at the Annual Con-
vention, June 28, 2007, available at www.bostonbar.org/pub/speeches/young_june07.pdf. 
39 Judge William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Court Judges, Fed. Lawyer, July 
2003, at 30, 32 [hereinafter Open Letter]. For further discussion on the critical role of the 
jury in our democratic society, see In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. 
Supp. 994, 1005–06 (D. Mass. 1989); The Civil Jury, supra note 27, at 1433. See generally 
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312 (1997) (discuss-
ing how the processes of our court system vindicate and strengthen democracy by involv-
ing litigants with standing in the explication and application of our laws). 
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II. Fact-Finding 
You have to listen to the bastards, Austin. They might just have something. 
—Hon. Franklin H. Ford40
 Over a quarter century has passed since I first came to the bench. I 
remember well the extraordinary emphasis that was then placed on 
fact-finding, and the meticulous observance of the rules of evidence, in 
order that we might “get it right.”41
 Yet as I came to learn over the next few years, fact-finding is diffi-
cult. Exacting and time consuming, it inevitably falls short of absolute 
certainty. More than any society in history, the United States entrusts 
fact-finding to the collective wisdom of the community. Our insistence 
on procedural safeguards,42 application of evidence rules,43 and our 
willingness to innovate44 are all designed to enhance impartial fact-
finding. 
 Judicial fact-finding is equally rigorous. Necessarily detailed, judi-
cial fact-finding must draw logical inferences from the record, and, af-
ter lucidly presenting the subsidiary facts, must apply the legal frame-
work in a transparent written or oral analysis that leads to a relevant 
conclusion.45 Such fact-finding is among the most difficult of judicial 
tasks. It is tedious and demanding, requiring the entirety of the judge’s 
attention, all her powers of observation, organization, and recall, and 
every ounce of analytic common sense he possesses. Moreover, fact-
                                                                                                                      
40 These are the words of my distinguished predecessor, Franklin H. Ford to his legen-
dary Courtroom Deputy Clerk, Austin W. Jones. See Young, Vanishing Trials, supra note 23, 
at 93. 
41 Hon. Raymond S. Wilkins, former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court. “Facts are like flint,” he used to say. I clerked for Chief Justice Wilkins, and have 
never met a greater proponent of careful fact-finding. 
42 See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 1–3 (1994) (discussing “beyond reasonable 
doubt” standard of proof); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (mandating jury 
trials for serious crimes); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748–49 (1948) (requiring 
jury unanimity in death penalty cases). But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–12 
(1972) (affirming non-unanimous criminal convictions and holding that the Constitution 
does not require unanimity in all criminal trial verdicts). 
43 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588–95 (1993). 
44 See, e.g., Fortenberry v. Maggio, 664 F.2d 1288, 1288 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing juror 
note-taking); People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 46–48 (Cal. 1993) (allowing juror questions); 
Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 179 (7th ed. 2007) (outlining the panorama of de-
monstrative aids); Administrative Office of the District Court of Mass., Criminal 
Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009), available at http://www. 
mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/jury-instructions/criminal/pdf/ 0004- 
drafting-a-plain-language-jury-instruction.pdf (providing jury instructions in plain English). 
45 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). 
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finding is the one judicial duty that may never be delegated to law 
clerks or court staff.46 Indeed, unlike legal analysis, many judges will 
not even discuss fact-finding with staff, lest the resulting conclusions 
morph into judgment by committee rather than the personal judgment 
of the duly constituted judicial officer. 
 Fair and impartial fact-finding is supremely important to the judi-
ciary because, as Judge Robert E. Keeton has so cogently observed: 
Judging is choice. Choice is power. Power is neither good nor 
evil except as it is allocated and used. Judging in a legal system 
is professional. Professionals, including judges, represent in-
terests other than their own. One who accepts a professional 
role in a legal system accepts an obligation to confine the ex-
ercise of power within the limits of authority. For each profes-
sional role the limits of authority are defined by law . . . . The 
quality of judging in a legal system depends on commitment. It 
depends first on commitment to the aim of justice. Second, it 
depends on commitment to professionalism . . . . Third, the 
quality of judging depends on commitment to method. Judi-
cial choice, at its best, is reasoned choice, candidly ex-
plained.47
While trial court legal analysis is appropriately constrained by statutes 
and the doctrine of stare decisis, the true glory of our trial courts, state 
and federal, is their commitment to fair and neutral fact-finding. Prop-
erly done, facts found through jury investigation or judicial analysis 
truly are “like flint.”48
 Yet there has been virtual abandonment by the federal judiciary of 
any sense that its fact-finding processes are exceptional, or due any spe-
cial deference.49 Federal district court judges used to spend their time 
                                                                                                                      
 
46 Cf. David Crump, Law Clerks: Their Roles and Relationships with Their Judges, 69 Judi-
cature 236, 237 (1986) (acknowledging a common criticism of the “overuse” of law clerks 
who are not constitutionally authorized to perform judicial functions); John B. Cheadle, 
The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 Yale L.J. 892, 896 (1918) (noting that a judge can-
not further delegate authority with which he himself has been delegated and entrusted). 
47 Robert E. Keeton, Keeton on Judging in the American Legal System 5 (1999). 
48 Wilkins, supra note 41. 
49 This is similar to what Marc Galanter calls the “jaundiced view” —that there has 
been a decline in faith in adjudication by the courts and their key constituencies—a “turn 
from law, a turn away from the definitive establishment of public accountability in adjudi-
cation” and that there exists a “very real fear of trials.” He argues that lawyers, judges, and 
corporate users, misled by the media, believe that America is amidst a “litigation explo-
sion” and that trials are expensive and risky because juries are pro-plaintiff, “arbitrary, 
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on the bench learning from lawyers in an adversarial atmosphere, and 
overseeing fact-finding by juries or engaging in it themselves. This was 
their job and they were proud of it. Today, judges learn more reflec-
tively, reading and conferring with law clerks in chambers. Their pri-
mary challenge is the proper application of the law to the facts—facts 
that are either taken for granted, or sifted out of briefs and affidavits, 
and, in the mode of the European civil justice systems, scrutinized by 
judges and clerks behind closed doors.50 While judges do talk to law-
yers in formal hearings, these hearings can be short, and usually serve 
to test and confirm a judge’s understanding rather than develop it.51
 The major reasons for the decline in the preeminence of fact-
finding are not structural but cultural. On the civil side, they result from 
a marked shift in emphasis from the trial of actual disputes to mere liti-
gation management, resulting in an overuse of summary judgment52 
and a concomitant settlement culture.53 On the criminal side, the sen-
tencing guidelines ushered into judicial opinions a degree of sophistry 
heretofore unknown to the federal judiciary. For seventeen years, an 
entire generation of federal judges spoke of sentencing based on “facts” 
determined by a “preponderance of the evidence,” when what they had 
before them was manifestly not evidence, but rather “faux facts” that had 
neither been tested by cross examination nor presented to a jury.54
 In so doing, we lost our way. In 1980, the average amount of time a 
U.S. district judge spent in the court room was 790 hours. In 2008, the 
                                                                                                                      
sentimental and ‘out of control.’” See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and 
the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1255, 1266–68, 1272–73 (2005). 
50 For an apt criticism of this approach, see Sabin Willett, Clericalism and the Guan-
tanamo Litigation, 1 Northeastern U. L.J. 51, 52 (2009). See generally Dennis Jacobs, The 
Secret Life of Judges, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2855 (2007). 
51 See, e.g., Eugene R. Fidell, Hearings on Motions: A Modest Proposal, Nat’l L.J., Dec. 22, 
2008, at 23 (bemoaning the rarity of hearings on dispositive motions in the D.C. district 
court: “[e]ven in this digital era, there is still a participatory and symbolic aspect to the 
administration of justice that remains key to its legitimacy. That interest is not served when 
business is transacted without human contact.”). 
52 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 982, 984 (2003). 
53 See, e.g., In re One Star Class Sloop Sailboat Built in 1930 with Hull Number 721, 
Named “Flash II”, 517 F. Supp. 2d 546, 548, 552 (D. Mass. 2007), aff’d United States v. One 
Star Class Sloop Sailboat Built in 1930 with Hull Number 721, Named “Flash II”, 546 F.3d 
26 (1st Cir. 2008). 
54 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 280–81 (D. Mass. 2004), vacated in part, 
United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), vacated, United States v. Pacheco, 
434 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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average was just 353 hours, of which only 189 were spent in trial.55 The 
judiciary hates it when I say this, because the immediate reaction is that 
we are not working very hard, and that is wrong. We are working as 
hard, or harder, than ever before. It took seventy-five years for the Fed-
eral Supplement, the vanity press for district judges, to fill a thousand 
volumes; my first published opinion was in Volume 656. My most recent 
opinions appear in Volume 578 of the second Federal Supplement. If I 
survive another year, I will have opinions spanning a thousand volumes. 
And what are they about? Are they great cases, findings and rulings? 
There are a few, but as Patricia Wald, former chief of the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated, “[f]ederal jurisprudence is largely the product 
of summary judgment in civil cases.”56 If she had added motions to 
dismiss, she would have gotten it completely right. Page after page of 
carefully reasoned adjudications explaining why we don’t go to trial— 
and we wonder why trials are vanishing. 
 This massive drift away from rigorous fact-finding in open court 
did not happen randomly. It did not result from the personal predilec-
tions of those newly appointed to the trial bench, who are every bit as 
vigorous and skilled as their predecessors.57 The shift was instead occa-
sioned by less-than-subtle institutional cues from within the judiciary 
itself. For years, newly appointed district judges have been taught that 
the focus of their job is primarily the “management” of their caseload, 
not the trial of the cases before them.58 “Of course, we must be skilled 
                                                                                                                      
 
55 In 1980, the average trial time reported by federal judges who were active district 
judges for at least 11 months was approximately 550 hours. In 2002, the average trial time 
was just over 250 hours. See Federal Judicial Center, Report (based on data reported to 
the Administrative Office on the Monthly Report of Trials and Other Court Activity) [App. 
A]. Data for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 confirm that trial time has consistently remained 
lower than it was during the 1980s. See Data derived from the Reports of the Clerk, United 
States District Court, District of Massachusetts 2005–2008 [App. B]. There has also been a 
decrease in bench time and trials in the state courts. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: 
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 459, 459–60 (2004). 
56 Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1897, 1897 (1998). 
57 See Open Letter, supra note 39, at 31–33. 
58 The brilliant judge Richard S. Arnold cuts directly to the bone: 
I think in the 20 years since I was a district court judge, we’ve seen a tremen-
dous increase in volume, tremendous pressure to decide cases without think-
ing very much about them, tremendous pressures to avoid deciding cases. I 
mean, some judges will do almost anything to avoid deciding a case on the 
merits and find some procedural reason to get rid of it, coerce the parties 
into settling or whatever it might be. 
Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Little Case, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 663, 670 
(1999). My colleague, Judge Nancy Gertner, has also addressed this issue: 
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managers. But to what end? To the end that we devote the bulk of our 
time to those core elements of the work of the Article III trial judici-
ary—trying cases.”59
 Yet the time spent at trial continues to fall.60 While courtroom 
deputy clerks dutifully record the time each judge spends on the 
bench,61 the results are a closely guarded secret, known only to the 
Committee on Judicial Resources which is adjured to not share such 
information even within the judiciary.62 Although the Civil Justice Re-
form Act requires that judge-specific comparative data be published for 
cases over three years old and motions pending for more than six 
months,63 the central uniform measure of actual trial judging is never 
even mentioned, and those judges who desire to measure their efforts 
against the most productive courts are rebuffed by internal secrecy. 
 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts annually publishes 
the number of “trials” in which the federal judiciary engages, and ranks 
                                                                                                                      
In baby judge school, one trainer went so far as to begin a session on employ-
ment discrimination by saying, “Here’s how you get rid of these cases!” “Here’s 
how you get rid of these cases?” I could have sworn it was about justice, not dig-
ging for an excuse to close the case. When I was a baby judge we had more 
courses on case management, and mediation, than on opinion writing. 
Hon. Nancy Gertner, United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts, “A 
Quasi-Independent Judiciary,” Address before the Massachusetts Bar Foundation ( Jan. 26, 
2006) (on file with author); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 
380 (1982). 
59 Open Letter, supra note 39, at 33. 
60 Compare App. A with App. B. 
61 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 604  (2009) (outlining administrative duties of court per-
sonnel). 
62 See 3 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedures § A, chap. 2, part B, § 2, Part C, 
para. 6 (“Access to Committee Reports and Other Material”) (on file with author) (“Re-
ports approved by the Conference for transmission to Congress shall not be publicly re-
leased prior to their submission to Congress . . . . Background materials, files, minutes and 
the like, are considered working papers of the Conference . . . and generally are not avail-
able to the public.”). 
63 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472–482 (1990). This 
“sunshine” has had the predictable and desirable result of increasing judges’ productivity. 
See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990, 67 St. John’s L. Rev. 877, 900–03 (1993) (commending the reporting 
requirements of CJRA as possibly the most important and potentially successful features of 
the Act); Doreen Carvajal, Awaiting Judgment: New York’s Clogged U.S. Courts Delaying Civil 
Verdicts for Years, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1995, at 1 (reporting criticism of Federal Judge I. Leo 
Glasser and his delays in issuing verdicts and decisions in civil cases, in reference to CJRA 
reports). 
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the courts accordingly.64 Words matter,65 however, and the Conference 
has debased the term “trial.” The term once denoted a jury or bench 
proceeding that led to a verdict; now it encompasses any disputed evi-
dentiary hearing.66 Thus, a criminal case with a motion to suppress, a 
Daubert hearing,67 a genuine trial, and a sentencing hearing count as 
four “trials,” as does a civil patent case with a preliminary injunction 
hearing, a Markman hearing,68 a genuine trial, and a separate damages 
hearing. As a result, the Administrative Office inflates the actual num-
ber of trials by approximately 33%.69 However much this may impress 
Congress, such imprecision renders the term “trial” essentially mean-
ingless, a result not lost on scholars70 and the knowledgeable press.71 
To the judges, the message could not be more clear—trial time, indeed, 
any on-bench time, matters less than does “moving the business.”72 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 See, e.g., Statistics Div., Office of Judges Programs, Admin. Office of the U.S. 
Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2008 Annual Report of the 
Director 19, 23, 388 tbl. T-1. 
65 See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.: “A word is . . . the skin of a 
living thought . . . .”). 
66 See Memorandum from Michelle Rynne to Helen Costello (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file 
with author) (providing guidance on reporting criteria for JS10 Monthly Trials Reports: 
“The following are types of proceedings which should be reported as trials . . . hearings on 
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders . . . hearings on mental compe-
tency; hearings on petitions for probation revocation . . . hearings on motions to remand; 
evidentiary hearings . . . .”); see also Zach Lowe, Federal Court Statistics, or: How Numbers Can 
Drive You Mad, Law.com, Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly. 
jsp?id=1202424181868 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
67 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 579–95 (1993). 
68 See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
69 Cf. Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judgeship Act of 
2008: Hearing on S. 2774 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 88–89 (2008) 
(statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice) [hereinaf-
ter Jenkins statement]. 
70 Cf. Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1455, 1470–
73 (2003) (comparing the Administrative Office’s database records and case dockets in 
PACER for tort and inmate cases, and concluding that the Administrative Office method 
of recording judgments created disparities in the data). 
71 See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 66. 
72 The internal process of the Judicial Conference has real world consequences. For ex-
ample, from time to time the Judicial Conference takes upon itself the authority to advise the 
President not to nominate judges to fill vacancies it deems superfluous. It makes this decision 
by fixing an arbitrary cutoff point based upon the court’s “weighted caseload,” derived by a 
methodology that has been sharply (and accurately) criticized by independent observers. See 
S. Rep. No. 110-427, at 17–19 (2008); Jenkins Statement, supra note 69, at 82–95; see also John 
Shapard, Fed. Judicial Ctr., How Caseload Statistics Deceive 2–5 (1991), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/0020.pdf/$file/0020.pdf (discussing common 
problems of misinterpretation with caseload statistics). While the “weighted caseload” rank-
ing may be modified by various gestalt factors, none of them have anything to do with the 
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Judge Irene M. Keeley, former president of the Federal Judges Associa-
tion, states: 
Litigation management is our primary job, and, even with 
fewer trials, there is a lot of litigation to be managed. We trial 
judges still spend a lot of time on the bench resolving disputes, 
even if it is not always during trial. Discovery is a demanding— 
and growing—part of litigation management expense. Media-
tion—even when it occurs early—doesn’t always succeed in re-
solving the case. The lawyers engage in extensive, contentious 
discovery that requires an enormous amount of attention both 
from magistrate and district judges.73
Litigation management: hardly a shining vision. Once divorced from 
daily interaction with jurors, our written opinions subtly mock the very 
idea that democratic institutions might be made to serve the cause of 
justice. This leads us to prefer knowledge over hope, and the jury sys-
tem is, if nothing else, our country’s finest expression of hope. We dis-
trict judges are more than pint-sized court of appeals aspirants, for we 
have the sole and unique responsibility for our constitutionally guaran-
teed modes of fact-finding. Yet as judicial face time with jurors, lawyers, 
and litigants becomes increasingly rare, and as the federal courtrooms 
throughout the land go dark with disuse, the moral force of what is de-
creed is increasingly marginalized. Soon, society may begin to wonder 
why we have the lower federal courts at all. 
                                                                                                                      
actual work being performed by the judges of the affected court, i.e. the on bench and trial 
time of those judges. 
Even putting aside the larger issues of the separation of powers—the fact that the Ju-
dicial Conference is, in effect, advising the President not to enforce a law passed by Con-
gress setting the number of district judges within each judicial district and is interfering 
with the Senate’s constitutional prerogative to advise and consent to such nominations—
what message does this communication send to the people of the affected district? Cf. S. 
Rep. No. 110-427, at 2–5, 20–21 (revealing the extent of the Judicial Conference’s influ-
ence over Congress’s power to constitute the lower courts, and including Sen. John 
Cornyn’s objections on behalf of his district to the Administrative Office’s recommenda-
tions). Can it be that the speed and quality of justice is too high in those locations and we 
need to cut back? And what of the active judges in such a district, knocking themselves out 
to try the cases before them and help other courts as well? Each one must know that, 
should she falter or fail, it is the official policy of the Judicial Conference that her seat shall 
lie vacant and her courtroom go dark. 
73 Conference Represents Federal Trial Judges, Third Branch, June 2003, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/june03ttb/interview.html (quoting Hon. Irene M. Keeley). 
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III. Where are You Going, Habeas Corpus? 
 James Robertson’s critically acclaimed work on habeas corpus, and 
the thorough analysis in Jonathan Shaw’s “The War and the Writ,” to-
gether explain the vicissitudes of the constitutionally guaranteed writ of 
habeas corpus in the years since September 11.74 It is important to note 
that the decline of habeas had begun well before that day, however, and 
that it was significantly encouraged by the judiciary. Even Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist was highly critical of our habeas jurisprudence.75 
As a result of this and similar criticism,76 Congress enacted the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which, under the 
guise of ordaining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, severely 
restricted access to the writ by those in government custody.77 AEDPA 
likewise restricts, perhaps unconstitutionally, the right of those lower 
federal courts independently to interpret the Constitution.78
 Congress, by adjusting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, 
can effectively strip disfavored classes from full access to justice, thereby 
restricting, if not extinguishing, cherished individual rights and liber-
ties.79 This is known as “rights stripping,”80 a legislative technique that 
descends directly from bills proposed in the 1980s to strip federal 
                                                                                                                      
74 See generally James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 Buff. L. Rev. 1063 
(2008); Jonathan Shaw, The War and the Writ, Harv. Magazine, Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 24. 
75 See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957–58 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the habeas remedy as “endlessly draw[ing] out legal proceedings” and 
thus rendering the death penalty to be a virtual illusion). 
76 Verbal and political attacks on an independent federal judiciary are as old as the re-
public, and as healthy. See generally Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme 
Court is Destroying America (2005). We learn from our history, recoiling from extrem-
ism. Each generation must strike anew the balance between Congress, the President, and 
the Judiciary. 
77 Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 
2253–2255, 2261–2266 (2000). 
78 See Evans v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1, 1–5 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J., dissenting); see also 
Bradley v. Henry, 428 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2005) (implying that the AEDPA, as inter-
preted, places unworkable restrictions on the federal courts’ powers of review). 
79 As former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay once remarked, “We set up the 
courts. We can unset the courts.” Miara v. First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 
20, 70 n.57 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Peter Wallsten, 2 Evangelicals Want to Strip Courts' 
Funds, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 2005, at A22.) 
80 In addition to the AEDPA, examples of “rights stripping” include its cousins, the 
Real ID Act of 2005, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(5), 119 Stat. 302 (2005); Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 505(B)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 110 U.S.C.). Note 
that the Real ID Act is part of the much broader Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 
Stat. 231 (2005). 
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courts of jurisdiction over abortion and busing.81 As commentators 
have noted, “jurisdiction stripping” is, in effect, “rights stripping,”82 be-
cause it removed the nuanced views of the 674 federal district judges 
from the rich common law tradition of evolutionary statutory interpre-
tation, leaving the matter solely to appellate courts. While society has 
subsequently recoiled from stripping rights from women and minori-
ties, it has had no such hesitancy concerning felons and aliens. Sadly, 
resort to this technique has become more frequent with the concomi-
tant erosion of the very rights a truly independent judiciary was de-
signed to protect.83
 So it was that at the dawn of the new millennium, with the jury 
sidelined and marginalized, the judiciary seemed more interested in 
discussing recondite issues of law than in the robust but tedious process 
of hammering out unassailable findings of fact. Thus, the Great Writ 
was great no more. 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of Review, 
114 Harv. L. Rev. 1551, 1552 (2001). 
82 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out 
of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 129 n.1, 141 (1981) (arguing that such 
measures unduly burden constitutional rights). Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsid-
ered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 261–69 (1988) (discussing 
study on parity of state and federal courts). 
83 See Gonzalez v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 n.5 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 
Brackett v. United States, 270 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2001), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 
544 U.S. 295 (2005). 
It is constitutional bedrock that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III , § 1. There is but a single limit on Con-
gress’ broad powers to establish and disestablish inferior courts, expand or trim their ju-
risdiction, and move jurisdiction from one such court to another. That limit is the Ameri-
can jury. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”); Id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”). These constitutional commands necessarily 
require the existence of jury trial courts to give them effect. 
Efforts to water down the plain language of the Constitution continue to this day. See 
The Civil Jury, supra note 27, at 1493–1503 (discussing proposals to limit the jury’s role in 
complex civil cases); see also Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1665, 1686 
(2005) (suggesting that the United States has “outgrown” the philosophy undergirding the 
Seventh Amendment). 
The jury, that most vital expression of direct democracy extant in the United States 
today, thus functions as a practical and robust limitation on congressional power. It is as 
crucial and central a feature of the separation of powers between the Legislature, the Ex-
ecutive, and the Judiciary as the Supreme Court. See Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A 
Structural Critique of the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 345, 377 (2005) 
(“[T]he jury can serve . . . as a structural protection within the constitutional scheme.”). 
Indeed, within her proper fact-finding sphere, a juror is the constitutional equal of the 
President, a Senator or Representative, or the Chief Justice of the United States. 
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IV. And Now . . . Torture 
 Under the Bush administration, for the first time in the history of 
our republic, the torture of prisoners84 became an official instrument 
of state policy.85 Neither the weakening of our jury system, the judicial 
disdain for fact-finding, nor the restrictions on habeas corpus were 
solely responsible for this development. Yet taken together, the cultural 
desuetude into which these essential elements of our governance had 
fallen were all key ingredients of this truly breathtaking shift in the 
American identity. 
 In vesting the “judicial power of the United States” in our court sys-
tem, the Constitution commands, “[t]he trial of all crimes, except in 
cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.”86 There was a time when we 
meant it.87 Military tribunals once encompassed only what was necessary 
to maintain our forces in the field, and swept within their ambit only 
those recognized offenses that harmed our combat operations.88 For 
over two hundred years, through the “fiery trial” of the Civil War89 and 
two cataclysmic World Wars, we survived and flourished, a beacon of 
hope to all humankind, without a doctrine that concerned the treat-
ment of “enemy combatants.” 
 No more. Jack Goldsmith’s brilliant book, The Terror Presidency, re-
veals the relative ease with which legal and constitutional constraints 
                                                                                                                      
84 For an independent analysis of the extent to which torture by the United States has 
taken place in recent years, see International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the 
Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody, WAS 07/76, Feb. 14, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf. 
85 I am not such an American exceptionalist as to suggest that individual Americans do 
not torture, rape, and kill in what they conceive is the national interest; clearly, we do. See, 
e.g., Michael Bilton & Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai 102–63 (1992) (detailing mas-
sacre of approximately four hundred civilians, and other atrocities by U.S. troops in the 
Vietnamese village of My Lai on March 16, 1968). General Sherman had it right when he 
said, “war is all hell.” See Stanley P. Hirshson, The White Tecumseh: A Biography of 
General William T. Sherman 372 (1997). Until today, however, our national policy has 
always abhorred torture, and we have prosecuted those who have conducted it. See generally 
Paul Kramer, The Water Cure, New Yorker, Feb. 25, 2008, at 38 (recounting the public 
outcry, Congressional hearings, and courts martial related to water-boarding and other 
atrocities committed by U.S. soldiers in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902). 
86 U. S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (capitalization altered from original). 
87 See Amar, supra note 35, at 236. 
88 Military tribunals should not be confused with military courts-martial. Although 
they can be used to prosecute similar things, the latter provides for trial by jury. See generally 
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, Manual for Courts Martial United 
States (2008) (describing court martial procedures, as well as offenses that threaten suc-
cess of the military mission, such as Spying, Aiding the enemy, and Espionage). 
89 See generally Carl Sandburg, The Fiery Trial (Dell Publ’g Co. 1959) (1948). 
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can be swept away in a time of fear and uncertainty simply by declaring 
a “new” status for those whom we fear the most.90 Indeed, the heroes of 
our time are military lawyers such as Lieutenant Commander Charles 
Swift. Upon being assigned to defend one of the Guantanamo detain-
ees he was told, “Your job is to plead him out.” Swift replied, “My job is 
to be his lawyer, Sir.”91 Other heroes include the free press which 
brought the horrors of Abu Ghraib to light,92 and the American people 
who, notwithstanding the equivocation of their leaders, well under-
stood that waterboarding was torture. 
 This left Congress in a quandary, and it is in the resulting analysis 
of the laws that one can see just how far the debate has shifted, and how 
marginalized the lower federal courts have allowed themselves to be-
come. Ultimately, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) 
of 200593 and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 200694 with sig-
nificant bipartisan majorities. These measures sought both to preserve 
national security by placing further limitations on habeas, and to refute 
the charge that we were officially engaged in the systematic torture of 
prisoners. Yet behind the carefully parsed language, circumlocutions, 
and strict limitations on judicial review,95 remains a stark and sobering 
fact: for the first time in our nation’s history, Congress has legislatively 
sanctioned the torture of prisoners.96 This is why it was necessary for 
President Obama, to his great credit, to issue an executive order against 
torture soon after taking office.97
                                                                                                                      
90 See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 99–140 (2007) (discussing the Bush 
Administration’s treatment of enemy combatants). 
91 Sabin Willett, My Worst Moment as a Lawyer, Remarks at Newburyport, Massachu-
setts Amnesty International meeting (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.pegc.us/ar- 
chive/Articles/willett_AI_20061205.pdf. 
92 One must also recognize the contributions of Al Jazeera, which, despite much overt 
propaganda, has displayed flashes of journalistic brilliance and brought home to us here 
in the United States how we are perceived in much of the world. Hugh Miles, Al Jazeera: 
The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West 61 
(2005) (noting that Al Jazeera has won several international journalism awards). 
93 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, §§ 1001–1006, 
119 Stat. 2680 (2005). The DTA was tacked onto a broad appropriations bill, the Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006. 
94 See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3930, 
120 Stat. 2600. 
95 See, e.g., id. 
96 See 151 Cong. Rec. S12381, S12385, S12394, S12397 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2005); Jane 
Mayer, The Dark Side 321 (2008); see also H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, at 524 (2005) (acknowl-
edging and condemning the Pentagon’s use of torture at Abu Ghraib and other detention 
facilities in the report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
which contained provisions nearly identical to DTA). 
97 See Exec. Order No. 13, 491, 74 C.F.R. 16 ( Jan. 27, 2009). 
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 Today, only that order stands between us and the official resump-
tion of torture. To understand how that can possibly be, it is instructive 
to look at the legislative history of the DTA and MCA. Nowhere will you 
find mention of a jury,98 nor do the acts concern themselves much with 
rigorous fact-finding. Indeed, the fact-finding courts are totally stripped 
of their usual jurisdiction and review is granted only to a single appel-
late court without fact-finding jurisdiction or apparatus.99 Even this re-
view appears to echo the administrative model in that the “facts” to be 
reviewed are those established by the executive.100 This is so despite the 
fact that the very essence of habeas demands that the judiciary sort out 
the facts.101 While the status of these acts was placed in limbo by Boume-
dienne v. Bush,102 they may yet prove one of the enduring legacies of the 
Bush administration. 
 After all, why ought Congress exalt the American jury when the 
federal courts themselves seem to care so little about its contribu-
tions?103 There is no reason for Congress to value the fact-finding skills 
and procedures of the lower federal courts unless those courts them-
selves recognize this as their core function. Congress may reasonably 
wonder why habeas should matter so much for foreign detainees when 
it has so successfully limited it for domestic prisoners104 and substituted 
the most pallid of imitations for alien immigrants.105
                                                                                                                      
98 See generally 152 Cong. Rec. S10349 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (debating the MCA); 
151 Cong. Rec. S12375 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 2005) (debating amendments to the DTA). I 
suppose this means these Acts are not intended to deal with those who have committed 
crimes against the United States, as “all crimes, save for Impeachment, shall be tried by 
jury.” U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 3. This procedure applies to all offenders, whatever their 
status or nationality. 
99 See MCA § 3930; DTA § 1005(e)(1)–(3), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2271 (2008). 
100 See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006). 
101 See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271. 
102 Id. at 2274. 
103 The Apprendi line of cases may yet refute this assertion. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 446, 497 (2000); see also Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 (2007); 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314 
(2004). Oddly, however, the emphatic reassertion of the jury’s role in criminal cases ap-
plies with far less force in the federal courts for “practical” reasons. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248. 
This disjunction is fully explored in United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286–
89 (D. Mass. 2006). 
104 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 112, 121 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d, 
Brackett v. United States, 270 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2001), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 
544 U.S. 295 (2005). 
105 See Enwonwu v. United States, 199 F. App’x 6, 6–7 (1st Cir. Sept. 26, 2006). 
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Conclusion 
 So the great work is laid before each of us—the work of insuring 
national security and, at the same time, preserving civil liberties. In a 
symposium featuring leading scholars on the laws of war and the 
proper response to terrorism, an Article on jury size, trial hours and 
domestic habeas issues may seem wide of the mark. It is not. I seek here 
to illustrate a truth so basic it may seem banal—a rend anywhere in the 
social fabric weakens our shared mantle everywhere. For most of us, 
these issues arise not in notorious cases, writs of certiorari, or sweeping 
constitutional decisions.106 For us, rather, it is the quotidian attention 
to the rights, needs, and concerns of individual litigants, sometimes 
poised against the equal rights of society as a whole. 
 I have argued that the judiciary needs to get back to basics, in or-
der better to explain to society the enormous values that are lost when 
the jury is sidelined, fact-finding marginalized, and the Great Writ de-
rided. I posit that the lower federal courts are today ill-positioned to 
meet the compelling challenges of the Twenty-First century. No doubt 
others, equally concerned and well-informed, will disagree; so much 
the better, for robust debate is good for society. What we can no longer 
afford is a papering over of these differences with the bland assertion 
that all is well with the lower federal courts. It is not. 
 This much, however, I know is true: “You [die] when you [refuse] 
to stand up for right. You [die] when you [refuse] to stand up for 
truth. You [die] when you [refuse] to stand up for justice.”107 What’s 
more, “liberty and justice for all”108 matter—today as much as any time 
in our history. So when the death knell sounds for anyone’s civil liber-
                                                                                                                      
106 In over thirty years of judicial service, I have presided over but two so-called “terror-
ist” cases. One, United States v. Levasseur, resulted in acquittal on the charge of seditious 
conspiracy after an 11 ½ month trial and 22 days of sequestered deliberations. See generally 
699 F.Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1988). The second, United States v. Reid, resulted in a guilty plea. 
See 214 F.Supp.2d 84, 87 (D. Mass. 2002). 
It has long been the tradition in the federal district courts that the judge imposes a 
criminal sentence in open court with the offender present; the judge frequently explains 
the reasons for the sentence. See generally Jeffrey Brandon Morris, Calmly to Poise the 
Scales of Justice: A History of the Courts of the District of Columbia Circuit 3–
31 (2001); Peter G. Fish, Federal Justice in the Mid-Atlantic South: United States 
Courts from Maryland to the Carolinas, 1789–1835 (2002). My remarks in sentenc-
ing Reid presaged certain of the themes amplified here; they are set forth in App. C. See 
Transcript of Disposition, United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp.2d 84, 87 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(Criminal No. 02-10013-WGY) ( Jan. 30, 2003). 
107 Martin Luther King, Jr., Sermon at Ebenezer (Nov. 5, 1967), in The Autobiogra-
phy of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998). 
108 36 U.S.C. § 172 (2002) (the Pledge of Allegiance). 
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ties, “never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”109 
To me, Ronald Reagan may have said it best: “[f]reedom is a fragile 
thing and is never more than one generation away from extinction. It 
is not ours by inheritance; it must be fought for and defended con-
stantly by each generation, for it comes only once to a people.”110
                                                                                                                      
109 John Donne, 3 The Works of John Donne 575 (Henry Alford ed., 1839). 
110 Ronald Reagan, Governor of California, Inaugural Address ( Jan. 5, 1967), available 
at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/govspeech/01051967a.htm. 
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Appendix A 
Average Trial and Nontrial Time Reported on JS-10 by Judges Who Were Active District Judges All 
Year and Reported Time for at least 11 Months
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Appendix B 
Average Trial & Non-Trial Hours Reported by Active Judges as of Sept. 2008
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Appendix C 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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Criminal No. 
02-10013-WGY 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
                * 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA     * 
                                       * 
v.                                 *  DISPOSITION 
                                          *       (Excerpt) 
RICHARD C. REID           * 
                * 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 BEFORE: The Honorable William G. Young, 
 District Judge 
 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
     GERARD T. LEONE, TIMOTYH Q. FEELEY, COLIN 
 G.K. OWYANG and GARY S. KATZMANN, Assistant United 
 Sates Attorneys, 1 Courthouse Way, Boston, Massachusetts 02210 
 
 
     OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL DEFENDER (By Owen S. 
 Walker, Esq., Tamar R. Birckhead and Elizabeth L. Prevett, Esq.), 
 408 Atlantic Avenue, Third Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02210, 
 on behalf of the Defendant 
 
 
         1 Courthouse Way 
         Boston, Massachusetts 
 
         January 30, 2003 
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 THE COURT: Mr. Richard C. Reid, hearken now to the sentence 
the Court imposes upon you. 
 On Counts 1, 5 and 6 the Court sentences you to life in prison in 
the custody of the United States Attorney General. On Counts 2, 3, 4, 
and 7, the Court sentences you to 20 years in prison on each count, 
the sentence on each count to run consecutive one with the other. 
That’s 80 years. 
 On Count 8 the Court sentences you to the mandatory 30 years 
consecutive to the 80 years just imposed. 
 The Court imposes upon you on each of the eight counts a fine 
of $250,000 for the aggregate fine of $2 million. 
 The Court accepts the government’s recommendation with re-
spect to restitution and orders restitution in the amount of $298.17 to 
Andre Bousquet and $5,784 to American Airlines. 
 The Court imposes upon you the $800 special assessment. 
 The Court imposes upon you five years supervised release simply 
because the law requires it. But the life sentences are real life sen-
tences so I need not go any further. 
 This is the sentence that is provided for by our statutes. It is a fair 
and just sentence. It is a righteous sentence. Let me explain this to 
you. 
 We are not afraid of any of your terrorist co-conspirators, Mr. 
Reid. We are Americans. We have been through the fire before. There 
is all too much war talk here. And I say that to everyone with the ut-
most respect. 
 Here in this court where we deal with individuals as individuals, 
and care for individuals as individuals, as human beings we reach out 
for justice. 
 You are not an enemy combatant. You are a terrorist. You are not 
a soldier in any war. You are a terrorist. To give you that reference, to 
call you a soldier gives you far too much stature. Whether is it the of-
ficers of government who do it or your attorney who does it, or that 
happens to be your view, you are a terrorist. And we do not negotiate 
with terrorists. We do not treat with terrorists. We do not sign docu-
ments with terrorists. We hunt them down one by one and bring them 
to justice. 
 So war talk is way out of line in this court. You’re a big fellow. But 
you’re not that big. You’re no warrior. I know warriors. You are a ter-
rorist. A species of criminal guilty of multiple attempted murders. 
 In a very real sense Trooper Santiago had it right when first you 
were taken off that plane and [placed] into custody, and you won-
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dered where the press and . . . TV crews were, and [he] said, “you’re 
no big deal.” You’re no big deal. 
 What your counsel, what your able counsel and what the equally 
able United States Attorneys have grappled with, and what I have as 
honestly as I know how tried to grapple with, is why you did some-
thing so horrific. What was it that led you here to this courtroom to-
day. I have listened respectfully to what you have to say. And I ask you 
to search your heart and ask yourself what sort of unfathomable hate 
led you to do what you are guilty and admit you are guilty of doing. 
 And I have an answer for you. It may not satisfy you. But as I 
search this entire record it comes as close to understanding as I know. 
 It seems to me you hate the one thing that to us is most precious. 
You hate our freedom. Our individual freedom. Our individual free-
dom to live as we choose, to come and go as we choose, to believe or 
not to believe as we individually choose. 
 Here, in this society, the very winds carry freedom. They carry it 
everywhere from sea to shining sea. It is because we prize individual 
freedom so much that you are here in this beautiful courtroom. So 
that everyone can see, truly see that justice is administered fairly, indi-
vidually, and discretely. 
 It is for freedom’s sake that your lawyers are striving so vigorously 
on your behalf and have filed appeals, [and] will go on in their . . . 
representation of you before other judges. We care about it. Because 
we all know that the way we treat you, Mr. Reid, is the measure of our 
own liberties. 
 Make no mistake, though. It is yet true that we will bear any bur-
den, pay any price, to preserve our freedoms. 
 Look around this courtroom. Mark it well. The world is not going 
to long remember what you or I say here. Day after tomorrow it will 
be forgotten. But this, however, will long endure. Here, in this court-
room, and courtrooms all across America, the American people will 
gather to see that justice, individual justice, justice, not war, individual 
justice is in fact being done. 
 The very President of the United States through his officers will 
have to come into courtrooms and lay out evidence on which specific 
matters can be judged, and juries of citizens will gather to sit and 
judge that evidence democratically, to mold and shape and refine our 
sense of justice. 
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 See that flag, Mr. Reid? That’s the flag of the United States of 
America. That flag will fly there long after this is all forgotten.111 That 
flag still stands for freedom. You know it always will. 
 Custody, Mr. Officer. Stand him down. 
                                                                                                                      
111 Well, perhaps not. I have recently been informed that on March 17, 2009, without 
discussion or debate, the Judicial Conference of the United States voted to advise the 
President that the next vacancy in this District ought to be left unfilled. See Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, Preliminary Report: Judicial Conference Actions 5 
(2009) (on file with author) (recommending to the President and the Senate “not to fill 
the existing judgeship vacancy in the District of Wyoming and the next judgeship vacancy 
occurring in the District of Massachusetts, based on the consistently low weighted 
caseloads in these districts.”). Thus, should I be the next judge in this District to falter or 
fail, it is now the official policy of the Judicial Conference that this position ought sit va-
cant, the courtroom go dark, and the flag of the United States of America, which has flown 
so proudly in this courtroom for 24 years, be taken down. 
